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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I . NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an administrative commercial driver's license 
disqualification case. Raymond Scott Peck (herein "Peck" or 
"Appellant") appeals from the decision of the Idaho Department of 
Transportation in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Preliminary Order entered the 18th day of May, 2012, 
disqualifying Peck from operating a commercial motor vehicle for 
a period of one year ("CDL disqualification") and from the 
decision of the District Court in the Opinion And Order On 
Petition For Judicial Review, entered February 4, 2013, upholding 
the CDL disqualification of Peck. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A Notice of Disqualification dated December 15, 2009 was 
mailed by the Idaho Transportation Department ("lTD") to Peck 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335. Agency R. Pg. l/Clerk R. Pg 34. 
Peck timely requested a hearing on the issue of disqualification 
(Agency R. Pg. 2/Clerk R. Pg 35). The proceedings on the 
disqualification were put on hold pending the outcome of the 
Administrative License Suspension ("ALS") challenge also brought 
by Peck. Following the confirmation of the ALS suspension by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, the Disqualification hearing was held on 
May 15, 2012 before hearing officer Michael Howell. Tr. 5/15/12. 
On or about May 18, 2012, the hearing officer for the Idaho 
Transportation Department entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order sustaining the 
disqualification by lTD. Agency R. Pgs. 16-20/Clerk R. Pg 49-53. 
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Peck filed his Petition For Judicial Review And Ex Parte 
Application For Stay Of Agency Decision on June 5, 2012 with the 
District Court. Agency R. Pgs. 21-29/Clerk R. Pgs. 9-17. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court 
issued its Opinion And Order On Petition For Judicial Review on 
February 4, 2013 upholding the CDL disqualification. Clerk R. 
Pgs. 117-125. This appeal by Peck timely follows. 
III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioner Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner 
County, Idaho. The Petitioner Peck was arrested and cited for 
allegedly driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code 
on or about December 2, 2009. The criminal charges were resolved 
in the criminal case proceedings. 
Also, the arresting Officer issued on December 2, 2009 and 
served an ALS Notice of Suspension upon Peck on or about December 
3, 2009, purporting to suspend the driving privileges of the Peck 
for a period of 90 days set to commence 30 days from December 3, 
2009 pursuant to Idaho Code, Title 18, Chapter 80 (herein "ALS 
Suspension"). The ALS Suspension was upheld on appeal in Peck v. 
State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37 
(Ct .App. 2012). 
The Respondent State of Idaho Department of Transportation, 
on December 15, 2009 served Peck by U.S. Mail a Notice of 
Disqualification of CDL privileges pursuant to Idaho Code Title 
49, Chapter 3 (herein "COL Disqualification"). Agency R. Pg. 
l/Clerk R. Pg 34. 
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A telephonic hearing on the CDL Disqualification was held on 
May 15, 2012 with Idaho Transportation Department Hearing Officer 
Michael B. Howell. The Hearing Officer upheld the CDL 
Disqualification. The matter proceeded to judicial review. The 
District Court upheld the CDL Disqualification. 
As it relates to the CDL Disqualification, at the time of 
the traffic stop on December 2, 2009, the uncontested evidence 
from the 5/15/2012 Transcript of the hearing before the lTD 
Hearing Officer is as follows: 
1. Peck held a commercial driver's license. P. 3, L. 12-
14. 
2. Peck was not operating a commercial vehicle. P. 3, L. 
15-17, P. 5, L. 20-24. 
3. Prior to taking the blood alcohol concentration test, 
Peck was not advised of consequences to his CDL. P. 3, 
L. 18-19, P. 5, L. 25, P. 6, L. 1-4. 
4. Prior to taking the blood alcohol concentration test, 
Peck was not advised of consequences of Idaho Code § 
49-335(2). P. 3, L. 24-25, P. 4, L. 1-25, P. 5, L. 1-
7. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Peck's statement of the issues on appeal is as 
follows: 
(a) Was the Peck fully infor.med of the consequences of 
testing confor.ming to due process (procedural) for a CDL 
disqualification? 
(b) Is there a legitimate state concern confor.ming to due 
process (substantive) met by disqualifying the Peck's CDL when he 
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the conduct 
and when his license was subjected to the ALS suspension? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Peck seeks an award attorney fees on appeal 
against the Respondent State of Idaho, Department Of 
Transportation pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A 
PERSON'S COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE 
The standard of review for a decision by the State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation to disqualify a person's commercial 
driver's license was stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals (in a 
case dealing with an ALS suspension) in Bennett v. State, Dept. 
of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 142-43, (Ct. App. 2009), as follows: 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.D.A.P.A.) 
governs the review of department decisions to deny, cancel, 
suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's 
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In 
an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in 
its appellate capacity under I.D.A.P.A., this Court reviews 
the agency record independently of the district court's 
decision. Marsha~~ v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); 
Marshal~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court 
instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Cor,p., 130 
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marsha~l, 137 
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's 
factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, 
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, 
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 
ex re~. Bd. of Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 
(2000); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the 
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial 
right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette 
County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 
583, 586 (1998); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it 
shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings 
as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
The appellate Court applies this standard on review for a CDL 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5 
disqualification case. 
II. THIS CASE IS THE COL DISQUALIFICATION CHALLENGE 
This appeal is regarding the Peck's rights under the U.S. 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution to notice prior to being 
subjected to search and seizure for alcohol testing (procedural 
due process) and not being subjected to an arbitrary act 
(substantive due process). There are several different 
consequences that Peck faced flowing from the traffic stop and the 
breach alcohol content ("BAC") testing to which he was subjected. 
From his arrest and testing, Peck faced a criminal charge of 
driving under the influence under Title 18, Idaho Code. That 
charge was resolved in the criminal process. Peck also faced a 
driver's license "ALS Suspension" under Title 18, Idaho Code, 
which has been resolved as set forth in Peck v. Idaho Department 
of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37 (Ct.App. 2012). Peck also faces 
this driver's license "COL Disqualification" under Title 46, 
Chapter 3, Idaho Code. This matter is Peck's challenge of the CDL 
disqualification. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Peck's Title 18, 
Idaho Code suspension case, recognized that Peck's Title 49, Idaho 
Code disqualification was not before them. 
III. PECK HAS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Idaho Code § 49-335 Disqualifications and penalties--
Commercial driver's license, under subsection (2) provides that 
Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who 
holds a class A, B or C driver's license is disqualified 
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 
not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit 
to or submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's 
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alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances concentration 
while operating a motor vehicle. 
Peck has both substantive due process and procedural due 
process rights under the Due Process Clauses of the United States 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution as it relates to the CDL 
Disqualification provisions of Idaho Code § 49-335. 
As set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals regarding 
procedural due process in In re Suspension of Driver's License of 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 945-46 (Ct.App. 2006), 
Although Gibbar does not distinguish whether he argues a 
violation of the Due Process Clauses of the United States or 
Idaho Constitution, the due process guarantees derived from 
the two constitutions are substantially the same. Rudd v. 
Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115, 666 P.2d 639, 642 (1983). Because 
the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves state 
action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensees, drivers' licenses may not be taken away without 
procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 
S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-80 (1977); Be~~ v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 
90, 94-95 (1971); State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 3-4, 704 
P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985). Courts must consider three factors 
in procedural due process challenges: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
Mathews v. E~dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 
47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33(1976). 
As set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeal regarding 
substantive due process in State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 699 
(Ct. App. 2001) 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
administration of a blood alcohol test is a seizure of the 
person and a search for evidence within the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 
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Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woole~, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 
775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 
680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App.1984). Warrantless searches or 
seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they come 
within one of several judicially recognized exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New H~shire, 403 U.S. 
443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-
76(1971); Woole~, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at 1212. 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128 
Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct.App.1996). Idaho's 
driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of 
possessing a valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle 
is deemed to have consented to an evidentiary test for blood 
alcohol concentration where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has been driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI 
laws. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1); McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 
182, 187, 804 P.2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990); see also South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 916, 920, 74 
L.Ed.2d 748, 755-56 (1983). 
Also, as set forth in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-834 
(Idaho 2002) the warrantless search exception is based upon 
implied consent. Implied consent requires notice of one's rights 
and the consequences. As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126 
Idaho 946, 947 (Ct.App. 1995) citing Matter of Griffiths, 113 
Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 (1987), a driver's license is 
cannot be suspended or disqualified if the driver is "not 
completely advised of his rights and duties." 
A. Peck's Substantive Due Process Rights Were Violated 
Because He Was Not Operating A Commercial Vehicle And 
Served The ALS Suspension Period 
Substantive due process protection means that the reason for 
depriving a driver of a license cannot be arbitrary. See In re 
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189, (Ct.App.1990). Peck was not 
operating a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his contact 
with law enforcement. The Title 18, Idaho Code ALS license 
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suspension (which includes the suspension of any commercial 
driving privileges held) has been upheld as meeting legitimate 
state police powers, rather than being double jeopardy or 
arbitrary when compared to a criminal conviction and criminal 
license suspension. There is no basis for another additional 
"disqualification" under Title 49 of a person's commercial 
driving privileges beyond the Title 18 suspension. There is no 
additional legitimate state concern to be met. Although in Buell 
v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257 (Ct.App. 2011), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that Title 49 disqualification is not 
double jeopardy in regards to the Title 18 suspension, the Court 
did not address substantive due process. The disqualification is 
arbitrary, as the underlying conduct has no relation to the 
disqualified conduct of operating a commercial vehicle for a 
year. Also, the legitimate state purpose of removing unsafe 
drivers for a period of time is met by the ALS suspension of all 
driving privileges (including any commercial component). 
The hearing officer did not address Peck's arguments 
regarding substantive due process. The District Court found that 
Peck's substantive due process rights were not violated given 
that removing unsafe drivers from the roadway is a legitimate 
state interest. The ALS suspension serves and in this matter did 
serve that very purpose in that it suspended all of Peck's 
driving privileges (including CDL privileges) for a period of 
time set by the Idaho legislature. This additional 
disqualification for an extended time period does not serve any 
additional purpose of removing unsafe drivers beyond the period 
already established in the ALS suspension provisions. The ALS 
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provisions have been held to meet that objective. See Williams 
v. State, Dept. of Transportation, 153 Idaho 380 (Ct.App. 2012). 
B. Peck's Procedural Due Process Rights Were Violated 
Because He Was Not Advised Of The Consequences 
Necessary For Informed Implied Consent 
Procedural due process protection means that a person must 
be completely advised of his rights and the consequences. The 
Idaho statutes providing for undertaking alcohol testing in Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A are based upon and only upheld under 
the theory of implied consent. The statutory fiction of implied 
consent is conditioned upon notice of the consequences being 
given to the driver immediately prior to the testing. This is 
informed implied consent. Without proper notice (information), 
the driver has not given implied consent and the license cannot 
be suspended. The evidence necessary for a COL disqualification 
therefore also requires implied consent, which requires proper 
notice (being informed) prior to testing. Without proper and 
adequate notice, the disqualification cannot be imposed. The 
disqualification is based upon the search and seizure producing 
the BAC results and therefore, to be upheld, must be part of the 
notice given to obtain the BAC results. 
This is because evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a 
seizure of the person and a search for evidence. In order to 
have a search and seizure, a driver's informed or implied consent 
must be based upon an accurate advice of the consequences. Here, 
prior to the request for testing, there is no advice given that a 
person's COL privileges are impacted differently than the other 
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driving privileges identified in the advisory (one year as 
opposed to 90 days, etc.). As such, there is not sufficient 
advice. The law requires the advice to be given to the driver to 
"validate" the implied or informed consent. 
Implied consent requires notice of one's rights and the 
consequences. As no notice is given of the disqualification 
provisions of Idaho Code § 49-335(2), there is no implied and no 
informed consent. Thus without being informed of the statutory 
provision, the testing is not upon consent, and violates due 
process. 
The statutory advisory language in the notice given to Peck 
only advises a driver of the Title 18 consequences, which are 
sufficient to uphold the Title 18 suspension. The statutory 
advisory language provided to Peck does not advise of the Title 
49 consequences. As such the Title 49 disqualification cannot be 
imposed or upheld. 
This is the very issue that the Idaho Supreme Court 
foreshadowed in the case of Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp., 
150 Idaho 164, 166 (2011). The Court, in considering an untimely 
request for hearing on an Idaho Code §18-8002A ALS notice of 
suspension for driving privileges, after reviewing the provisions 
of the standard notice given, stated that: 
The Notice did not address the situation presented by the 
underlying facts of this case: the consequences of refusing 
or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL who 
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of 
contact with law enforcement. This is significant because 
I.C. § 49-335(2) provides that a motorist who fails 
evidentiary testing is disqualified from operating a 
commercial vehicle for not less than one year. 
Wanner, 150 Idaho at 166. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals in the Buell case only dealt with 
the start date of a CDL disqualification, not the due process 
challenge argued here. Although the ultimate issue of the CDL 
disqualification in Wanner, which the Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly recognized in the opinion, was not reached, the Court 
strongly warned that the failure to advise was significant. Peck 
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of his contact 
with law enforcement and providing the alcohol testing. Peck was 
not advised of the CDL Disqualification consequences, and 
therefore implied consent as to the disqualification was not 
obtained, and the disqualification is invalid. 
IV. PECK SEEKS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 
12-117 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (effective May 31, 2009 through March 
27, 2012) provided as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political 
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award 
the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness 
fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. 
(2) If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a 
civil judicial proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, 
and the state agency or political subdivision or the court, 
as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to 
that portion of the case, it shall award the partially 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion 
of the case on which it prevailed. 
(3) Expenses awarded against a state agency or 
political subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid 
from funds in the regular operating budget of the state 
agency or political subdivision. If sufficient funds are not 
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available in the budget of the state agency, the expenses 
shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of 
section 67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not 
available in the budget of the political subdivision, the 
expenses shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9, 
title 6, Idaho Code. Every state agency or political 
subdivision against which litigation expenses have been 
awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission of 
its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental 
body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of 
expenses awarded and paid under this act during the fiscal 
year is stated. 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association or any other private organization; 
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county 
or any taxing district. 
(c) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in 
section 67-5201, Idaho Code. 
(5) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is 
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or less, the 
person must satisfy the requirements of section 12-120, 
Idaho Code, as well as the requirements of this section 
before he or she may recover attorney's fees, witness fees 
or expenses pursuant to this section. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (effective March 27, 2012) entitled 
"Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain 
instances" provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or a 
political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, 
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of 
the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or 
the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, finds 
that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the 
case, it shall award the partially prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case 
on which it prevailed. 
(3) Expenses awarded against a state agency or 
political subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid 
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from funds in the regular operating budget of the state 
agency or political subdivision. If sufficient funds are not 
available in the budget of the state agency, the expenses 
shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of 
section 67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not 
available in the budget of the political subdivision, the 
expenses shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9, 
title 6, Idaho Code. Every state agency or political 
subdivision against which litigation expenses have been 
awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission of 
its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental 
body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of 
expenses awarded and paid under this act during the fiscal 
year is stated. 
(4) In any civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a governmental entity and another 
governmental entity, the court shall award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses. For purposes of this subsection, 
"governmental entity" means any state agency or political 
subdivision. 
(5) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Person" means any individual, partnership, limited 
liability partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, association or any other private organization; 
(b) "Political subdivision" means a city, a county, any 
taxing district or a health district; 
(c) "Proceeding" means any administrative proceeding, 
administrative judicial proceeding, civil judicial 
proceeding or petition for judicial review or any appeal 
from any administrative proceeding, administrative judicial 
proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for 
judicial review. 
(d) "State agency" means any agency as defined in 
section 67-5201, Idaho Code. 
(6) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is 
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, the person 
must satisfy the requirements of section 12-120, Idaho Code, 
as well as the requirements of this section before he or she 
may recover attorney's fees, witness fees or expenses 
pursuant to this section. 
This matter first arose in 2009 by a letter from ITO. The 
judicial review was commenced June 5, 2012. Peck seeks an award 
of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 against the State 
of Idaho, Department of Transportation. Idaho Code § 12-117 
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governs the award of attorney fees in proceedings between persons 
and state agencies. 
Peck asserts substantively that the state cannot ~pose an 
additional CDL disqualification for any legitimate purpose when 
the ALS suspension is already the mechanism for removing unsafe 
drivers and substantively a CDL disqualification is not reasonably 
related to the conduct of not driving a commercial vehicle at the 
time. Peck asserts procedurally that for the State to have 
~plied consent to apply to the use of the BAC results to a CDL 
suspension, there must be informed consent at the time of the BAC 
testing. Just because the ALS was upheld (given the advice of the 
ALS consequences), that does not mean that the CDL 
disqualification procedure met due process. 
The policy behind I.C. § 12-117 is: "1) to serve as a 
deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and 2) to 
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made." 
Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994) 
(quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 
854, 859 (1984». 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon either substantive due process or procedural due 
process (or both, although not required), the Title 49 Notice of 
Disqualification given to Peck must be vacated. The hearing 
officer's decision and the District Court's decision should be 
vacated based upon (a) violates statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (c) is 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; and/or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 2013. 
i:d'~'I~ ~ .. JJHN A. FINNEY 
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant PECK 
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